ИСТИНА

Many types of compatibilism face problems with the manipulation arguments. They are used against both compatibilism about free will and about moral responsibility. But there is a strategy which can protect at least source compatibilism from these arguments. Let’s take Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument (FCA) (“Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life”, 2014, pp. 74-82) as an example: FCA is a very representative and persuasive sample of the manipulation reasoning. FCA must demonstrate that, if determinism is true, nobody can be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, and nobody can have free will in the corresponding sense. Also FCA says that there is no difference between the cases that would justify that Plum is not responsible in one case but is in another. In particular, there is no difference between manipulation and causal determinism. Let’s clarify what an FCA proponent understands under manipulation. Manipulation presupposes two things: the manipulated agent (MA) and the manipulating factor (MF). There is a necessary condition of manipulation (NCM): an agent A in the world W1 is compelled by the factor F to do X. It’s a case of manipulation, if in the alternative world W2, which lacks the factor F, in the same circumstances, agent A would not do X. Pereboom introduces NMC in the description of the first case: “Plum would not have killed White had the neuroscientists not intervened” (2014, pp. 76-77). NCM is crucial for all four cases FCA. It can be shown that, if NCM is not accepted, FCA collapses. But do all four cases meet NCM? In all cases, Plum is the MA, but the MFs are different. In first two cases the MFs are the actions of the neuroscientists. In the third case, MF is the effect of the training practices of Plum’s community. First three cases can meet the NCM: Plum (MA) is determined to kill White by the actions of neuroscientists or the effects of his training (MFs); but in the alternative worlds, lacking these MFs, Plum would not kill White. Thus, Plum is manipulated in the first three cases. But the fourth case doesn’t meet NCM. In this case, determinism is the MF. According to the NCM, there must be an alternative world W2, which lacks the MF. So, W2 must be an indeterminitic world. But in W2 Plum may as kill, as not kill White. The NCM is not met. If there is a possibility that in W2 Plum, nevertheless, does kill White, we get a possible Frankfurt case: an MA is determined by an MF to do X; the MF is removed, but MA probably does X. Source compatibilists believe that an agent can have compatibilistic free will and be morally responsible in the Frankfurt cases. There is a possibility of a Frankfurt case situation in the fourth case. Thus, it’s possible that somebody can have compatibilistic free will and be morally responsible in a deterministic world, and FCA is undermined. This strategy may be used against various manipulation arguments.