ИСТИНА

There is a number of empirical theories of consciousness. They are based on different philosophical assumptions. The global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) is motivated by an illusionists’ account of consciousness. Integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) uses an axiom of the intrinsic existence of consciousness or reality of consciousness. Contrary to GNWT this axiom of IITC is not supported by well-developed arguments. Instead, it is based on dualistic and panpsychist approaches to consciousness, which are themselves problematic. I will argue for a way to defend the first axiom of IITC. The infallibility of introspection, the transcendental status of consciousness, the specific nature of phenomenal concepts are usual ways of defending the existence of consciousness. But they are problematic. Introspection could be inadequate, the specific nature of phenomenal concepts are faced by the strategy of phenomenal concept or rely on introspection, or incoherent the transcendental argument is a non-starter. I’ll try to show it in details. The way out is to use the methodology of common sense. I think the existence of the physical in general relies on common sense. And in the same way, common sense works for consciousness. If you reject the existence of the last one then you must reject the existence of the first one. If this approach would work then there is a basis for IITC.