Аннотация:Russia’s oppressive policies in the North Caucasus are not the only answer to these questions. To simplify things, most in Russia’s Caucasian regions were until recently eager supporters of what might be called “Putinism.” For years, the peoples of the North Caucasus subscribed to the kind of contract Moscow concluded with all the other Russian regions: economic opportunities in exchange for an unchallenged loyalty to the Kremlin. The people in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and other regions enjoyed their new-found prosperity; they were happy to shop and stage sumptuous weddings while ignoring the counterparty to the contract.
There are a number of theories as to why the North Caucasus suddenly became much more vocal in 2018. My take is straightforward: Moscow’s hold on North Caucasus societies somewhat loosened in recent years. Today’s Moscow is fighting on a number of fronts: in Ukraine, in Syria, against the West. Those newer causes have pushed the North Caucasus off the list of the Kremlin’s top priorities. The big question now is whether those instances of civic self-organization can grow into a broader political mobilization. This might happen if Moscow continues to weaken its grip on the region.